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Goodwin v. Turner:
A Comparison of American
and Jewish Legal Perspectives
on Procreation Rights of Prisoners
BY DANIEL POLLACK,*
CHAIM STEINMETZ,** & ANDREA TELLERMAN'*
INTRODUCTION
onstitutional concerns arise when prisoners are stripped of
certain fundamental rights. Courts have determined that many
rights survive incarceration, inasmuch as they do not infringe
upon the legitimate penological interests of the correctional institution.
However, if an otherwise protected right is in conflict with a prisoner's
status as an inmate, that right may be infringed upon in order to facilitate
the objectives of the correctional facility
The right to procreate has been deemed a fundamental right by the
United States Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the privacy interest in
procreation can be limited by a correctional institution if the restriction is
reasonably related to furthering a legitimate penological interest. In
Goodwin v. Turner,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit demed an inmate the right to procreate through artificial
insemination because that method of procreation conflicted with acluevmg
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a legitimate penological interest - treating all inmates equally, to the
greatest extent possible.
This Article examines the Eighth Circuit's decision in Goodwn,
illustrates why the holding may not satisfy the required rational basis level
of scrutiny, and proposes that the Eighth Circuit may have incorrectly
demed Goodwin hIs fundamental right to procreate. The Goodwmn holding
is then contrasted with classic and recent Jewish law ("halacha"). Part I
reviews the privacy interest in procreation and the need to protect that right
so long as it does not conflict with an inmate's status as a prisoner. Part H
discusses penological objectives and limitations on conjugal visits, and
demonstrates why artificial insemination may be the only method available
to protect a prisoner's right to procreate. Part InI discusses the facts of
Goodwin v. Turner andthe court's reasoning for employing a rational basis
standard. Part I also analyzes the shortcomings of Goodwmn, arguing that
the majority's decision fails to satisfy a rational basis level of scrutiny and
therefore unjustly demes Goodwin his constitutional right to procreate. Part
IV discusses the comparative Jewish legal issues.
I. PROTECTED PRIVACY INTEREST IN PROCREATION
The Supreme Court has held that the liberty interest guaranteed to all
citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment2 encompasses a "right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy "3 This zone of
privacy includes freedom from governmental interference concerning
marriage,4 contraception,5 abortion, 6 and procreation.
7
2 The Fourteenth Amendment states, m part, "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
4 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that a statutory scheme
that prohibited interracial mamages solely on the basis of racial classifications
violated the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (stating in dictum that marriage was a fundamental right). Note,
however, that state courts have defied marrage to be the legal umon of a man and
a women. They do not recognize the rights of homosexuals to marry. See, e.g.,
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
' See Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) (holding that the right of
privacy includes the right of the individual to decide whether or not to use
contraception).
'See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (holding that the zone of privacy encompasses
a woman's choice whether or not to have an abortion).
7See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a statute
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While imprisonment automatically limits some privacy rights
otherwise guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment, courts have
established that inmates retain certain rights that are "not mconsistent with
[their] status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system,"9 because there is no "'iron curtain"' drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of the country '0 Many courts
have ruled that certain privacy interests of prisoners, including the right to
procreate," are fundamental and thus survive incarceration. Although there
are instances when this right to procreational choice may constitutionally
be limited, it cannot be completely denied. 2
that required mandatory sterilization of convicted felons whose crimes involved
moral turpitude).
'See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer 468 U.S. 517,526 (1984) (ruling that the security
interests of a correctional facility override an inmate's Fourth Amendment
protection against an unreasonable search m a prison cell).
9 Pell v. Procumer, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that prison regulation
restricting media representative's ability to select particular inmate for interview
and preventing prisoner himself from initiating an interview did not violate either
the press' or prisoner's First Amendment rights because alternative means of
communication were available); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
(holding that the right to marry survives incarceration).
0 oHudson, 468 U.S. at 523 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555
(1974)).
" See Slanner, 316 U.S. at 541. The Court recognized that even with prisoners,
"we are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Id. The Court, in noting the need to strictly scrutimze statutes
that irreparably deprive certain individuals of the basic right to procreate, indicated
that even inmates retain some right to procreate. See id., see also Goodwin v
Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1401 (8th Cir. 1990). Judge McMillian, in his dissenting
opinion in Goodwmn, argued that Slanner and Turner, when read together, strongly
suggest that the right to procreate survives incarceration because "marrage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at
1402 (McMillian, J., dissenting). Judge McMillian reasoned that the stability and
progress of our society are enhanced when marriage and procreation are viewed in
tandem. See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting); see also Christen M. Davis, Note,
Inmates and.4rtificial Insemination: A New Perspective on Prisoners' Residual
Right To Procreate, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP L. 163 (1993).
2 Courts have recognized the procreational rights of female inmates. See
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d
Cir. 1987) (holding that women have a fundamental right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy, and the costs incurred in accommodating pnsoners' constitutional rights
1997-981
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I. PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES
Courts have consistently held that restrictions on the constitutional
rights of minmates are justified if upholding those rights becomes
inconsistent with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional
facility.13 These objectives are twofold. First, incarceration is intended to
accomplish deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.14 The
second objective is to preserve prison security by maintaining order within
the correctional facility 15 To facilitate the accomplishment of the second
objective, courts give prison officials who restrict inmates' constitutional
rights a high degree of deference. 16
This deference is demonstrated by the fact that conjugal visits with
spouses have never been deemed a constitutional right.17 While courts have
cannot justify the complete deprivation of these rights).
13 See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
14 See id. (stating that the purposes of incarceration include deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and maintenance of institutional security within the
prison); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520 (holding that the restrictions placed on prisoners
help achieve the objectives ofjustice, such as deterrence and retribution); see also
SHELDONKRANTZ &LYNN S. BRAHNAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS
AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 270-71 (4th ed. 1991). The authors discuss and explain
the four purposes that incarceration may serve. The first purpose, incapacitation,
benefits a free society by physically restricting, or incapacitating, individuals,
whch prevents them from committing many crimes that might otherwise be
committeddurng theperiodthey are incarcerated. The secondpurpose, deterrence,
ams to prevent the free public and those locked away from engaging in future
criminal activitybecause offearofimpnsonment. The thirdpurpose, rehabilitation,
aspires to cure prisoners from the desire to commit crimes. The fourth purpose,
retribution, punishes prisoners for the crimes they have committed.
'
5SeeBellv. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,540 (1979) (upholding searches of inmates
after contact visits with outsiders because prisons must be allowed to adopt
measures that maintain security and order); Pell, 417 U.S. at 823 (declaring that a
prison's security interest is "central to all other correctional goals").
6SeeBlockv. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,589 (1984) (upholding a countyjail's
blanket prohibition on contact visitation with pretrial detainees; the Court
concluded that it was necessary to defer to the experienced judgment of the jail's
administration as to what measures were necessary to achieve the jail's legitimate
interest in maintaining security.).
7While some states have implemented conjugal visitationprograms, the United
States Bureau of Pnsons, the body that controls the federalprison system, has never
adopted such a program. See Thomas M. Bates, Note, Rethinlang Conjugal
Visitation in Light of the "AIDS" Crisis, 15 NEW ENG. . ON CRIM. & CIV
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recognized that a prisoner's interest in procreational choice and marriage
survives mcarceration,18 they have concluded that for apnsonerto maintain
a sexual relationsip is logically mconsistent with his or her incarceration
and the prison's interest m security 19 Such prohibition on conjugal
visitation directly infringes upon the procreational rights of prisoners,
leaving artificial insemination perhaps the only way to preserve inmates'
fundamental right to procreate.
II. A MALE INMATE'S RIGHT TO PROCREATE
.4. Goodwm v Turner
The constitutional question of whether a male inmate may be demed
the right to procreate by artificially msemmating his wife was at issue in
Good wn v. Turner 2 o Steven Goodwin, a federal prisoner in Missouri,
requested authorization and assistance from prison officials to artificially
inseminatehis wife.21 The Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") demedthe request,
stating that it had no program or provisions for implementing it.2 Goodwin
then brought suit in federal district court in an attempt to compel the
Bureau to "provide [him] with a clean container in which to deposit his
ejaculate, and a means of swiftly transporting the ejaculate outside the
prison."21 The district court held that Goodwin did not have a "fundamental
CONFINEMENT 121 (1989).
" See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of prisoners'
surviving interest in procreational choice and marriage.
19 See, e.g., Lyons v. Gillian, 382 F Supp. 198,200 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (holding
that the state is not obligated to make private places available for prisoners to
maintain sexual relations because intrusion into a prisoner's privacy rights is not
"tantamount to an intrusion into the prisoner's home"); see also McGinnis v.
Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1238 (Alaska 1975) (finding that "notions of privacy of
the marital bed [are] mconsistent with the compelling state interest in incarceration
of offenders").
2o Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).21 See Id. at 1397
' See id.
'Id. at 1398. Goodwin initially asked for four things in a writ of habeas corpus.
First, he requested that he be permitted to produce acceptable semen for
impregnating his wife. Second, he asked that a medical doctor be allowed to enter
the institution for the purpose of properly collecting and freezing his semen. Third,
he wanted to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases. And fourth, he wanted to
be assured that he would not be transferred to another institution until the dispute
1997-98]
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constitutional right to father a child through artificial insemination that
survive[d] incarceration."24
On appeal, Goodwin argued that the district court erred m its holding. 2
The appellate court assumed, without discussion, that Goodwin did indeed
retain his right to procreate while mcarcerated,2 6 and focused its attention
on whether the regulation was reasonably related to achieving its legitimate
penological interest.27 Applying a reasonableness test as set forth in Turner
v. Safley,28 the court held that even though granting Goodwin's request
would have been relatively simple, it was acceptable to deny it because the
prohibition of insemination was rationally related to the legitimate
penological objective of treating all mmates equally 29 The regulation was
reasonable even though alternatives were not available to Goodwm. 0 The
court noted that accommodating Goodwin's request would force the
Bureau to grant female inmates expandedmedical services to accommodate
pregnancies, thereby diverting resources from security and other legitimate
penological interests.'
The dissent by Judge McMillian argued that the majority was wrong
in finding that the regulation was reasonable.32 The dissent did not address
the appropriate level of scrutiny for the prison regulation. Instead, Judge
McMillian maintained that an inmate retains his or her right to procreate
while incarcerated, and argued that the blanket prohibition on artificial
insemination would not pass constitutional muster even under the rational
basis test.3
was fully resolved. The magistrate decided that Goodwin should resubmit his
request m a clear and detailed fashion, so that the Bureau could accommodate his
request or make specific objections. In response to this decision, the Bureau
adopted a blanket policy refusing all artificial insemination requests because it
would be difficult to treat men and women equally and all institutions would have
to develop collection, handling, and storage procedures. In turn, Goodwin then
filed suit, amending his request as described in text above. See id. at 1397
' Goodwin v Turner, 702 F Supp 1452, 1453 (W.D. Mo. 1988), affid, 908
F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
2 See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398.
21 See id.
27 See id.
28 Turner v Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (see infra notes 56-98 and accompany-
mg text).29 See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399.
30 See Id.
31 See Zd. at 1400.
32 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 1404 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
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B. Standard ofReview Used to Deny Procreational Rights
The issue that confronted the Eighth Circuit in Goodwin was whether
prohibiting a male inmate from artificially inseminating his spouse was a
violation of his constitutional right to father a child.34 The majority in
Goodwin concluded that security risks, scarce resources, and equal
protection concerns were validpenological concerns sufficient tojustifythe
restriction. However, the majority may have erred in finding that the
blanket prohibition on inmate procreation through artificial insemination
was reasonable.
The majority asserted that the appropriate level of review for the
restrictionplacedupon Goodwin's fundamental constitutional nghtwas not
heightened scrutiny, but rather mere rationality 35 The majority noted that
in Washington v. Harper36 the Supreme Court explained that the "proper
standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to
infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation
is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."' 37 The Goodwin
court went on to state that this standard must be applied even when the
"constitutionalnght claimedto have been infringed [upon] is fundamental,
and the State under other circumstances would [be] required to satisfy a
more rigorous standard of review "I Because Goodwin was incarcerated,
a mere rational basis standard was the appropriate level of scrutiny to use
to ascertain whether the Bureau could lawfully deny Goodwin his
constitutional right to procreate. 9
Courts have confirmed that inmates retain only limited constitutional
rights upon incarceration; nevertheless, constitutional concerns arise when
courts are permitted to simply "rubber stamp" prison regulations that
infringe upon rights without any justification." The need for a uniform
standard for determining whether a prison regulation is valid prompted the
Court, in Procunier v. Martinez,41 to devise such a standard. The prison rule
in question authorized censorship of prisoners' correspondence and thus
umplicatedpnsoners' First Amendment right to free speech. Thus, complete
deference to prison administrators was inappropriate, and the Court
See id. at 1399.
See id.36 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
3' Goodwmn, 908 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 224).3 1 Id. at 1398-99.
39 See id.
4o See Davis, supra note 11, at 175.
41 Procumer v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
1997-98]
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balanced penological interests and prisoners' rights4 2 in holding that the
regulation must further an important penological interest unrelated to the
suppression of unpopular ideas and must be no more restrictive than
necessary 43 Applying the new standard, the Court found that the prison
failedto demonstrate that the censorship regulations promoted an important
interest."
In Martinez, the Court employed an intermediate level of scrutiny
finding the prison rules unconstitutional.45 The Court reasoned that restrict-
ing inmate correspondence necessarily endangered the First Amendment
rights of nonprisoners. 6 The fact that the Martinez holding did not turn
solely on prisoners' rights helps to explain the Court's departure from its
traditional deference to prison admmstrators. 7
Several years later, however, the Court returned to "rubber stamping"
prison regulations when it held in Thornburgh v Abbott" that post-
Martinez decisions need only apply a reasonableness test to analyze the
constitutionality of challenged regulations affecting the rights of both
prisoners andnonprisoners. 49 This decision to subject prison officials to the
least restrictive standard reflected the Court's concern that the Martinez
standard effectively removed from prison officials the degree of discretion
they had enjoyed previously 50 In Thornburgh, the Court rejected a
heightened scrutiny standard and shifted back to favoring the rational basis
level of review 1
42 See id. at 407
'3 See zd. at 413. The use of a least-restnctive-means standard eliminated the
danger that unnecessarily broad regulations would pass constitutional muster. See
Davis, supra note 11, at 176 m88.
44 See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 415.45 See id. at 414.
46 See Id. at 408.
47 See id. at 409.
4' Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
49 See id. at 407; see Davis, supra note 11, at 181-85, for a discussion of
Thornburgh's rubber-stamping policy
" See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at409-1 1. The CourtviewedtheMartinezstanding
as inappropriate for "consideration of regulations that are centrally concerned with
the maintenance of order and security within prisons." Id. at 409-10.
" The Thornburgh Court, by approving the Turner test, made it clear that lower
courts should follow its lead in extending deference to the decisions of prison
administrators. See id. at 414-19 (applying the Turner factors); Turner v Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); Megan M. McDonald, Note, Thomburgh v. Abbott:
Slamming the Prison Gates on ConstitutionalRights, 17 PEPP. L. REV 1011, 1040-
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In Goodwin v. Turner, a prisoner argued that the Bureau of Prisons'
blanket policy against artificial insemination directly affected the
procreational rights of his wife, and that the restriction should be reviewed
under the Martinez heightened-scrutiny standard.52 The court deemed the
wife's rights irrelevant to its determination and therefore adopted the
Turner v. Safley Court's analysis,53 which set out guidelines for
determining reasonableness. 4 In his dissent, Judge McMillian recognized
that the Bureau's policy directly infringed the rights on nonprisoners, but
hesitated to apply Martinez because of its questioned validity after
Thornburgh.55
C. Application of the Turner v Safley Analysis
After determining that the appropriate standard of review for the
challenged regulation was the rational basis test, the court in Goodwin v.
Turner proceeded to decide whether the criteria set forth in Turner v. Safley
were met.5" Satisfaction of the Safley criteria establishes reasonableness. 7
The Safley test first requires a "'valid rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it."IS8 The Eighth Circuit held that the legitimate governmental
interest was achieving the Bureau-created policy of equal treatment of the
sexes.59 While equal treatment of male and female mmates is not
constitutionally mandated, the majority reasoned that it was indeed a
legitimate interest.6" The court decided that the Bureau did not have to
accommodate Goodwin's sunple request because it would not be able to
afford medical services to accommodate pregnancies of its female
prisoners.61 The majority reasoned that if the Bureau could not protect the
procreation rights of female inmates, male and female prisoners would be
treated differently with respect to artificial msemmation.62 Thus, the court
41(1990).
52 See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990).
53 See Safley, 482 U.S. at 78, 89-91.
4 See Goodwmn, 908 F.2d at 1399.
55 See id. at 1401 n. 1 (McMillian, J., dissenting).56 See id. at 1398-1400.
57 See Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
58 Goodwmn, 908 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
59 See id. at 1400.
o See id. (citing Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir. 1983)).
61 See id.
62 id.
1997-981
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held that the Bureau's interest m treating all inmates equally to the greatest
extent possible is rationally related to the prison prohibition on inmate
procreation.63
Judge McMillian, mi hs dissent, argued that denying Goodwm the right
to procreate was not rationally related to the equal treatment policy 64 He
asserted that m order to satisfy the first prong of the Turner test, the
objective underlying the regulation must be neutral and legitimate, and the
regulation or policy must be rationally related to that objective.65 Judge
McMillian reasoned that the equal treatment policy is indeed legitimate as
a general matter, but not when it was."accomplished at the expense of
denying the exercise of an otherwise accommodatable constitutional
right. '66 Judge McMillian also argued that the equal treatment objective
becomes relevant only if "we accept the Bureau's speculation that granting
Goodwin's novel request will lead to numerous requests by female inmates,
and thus result in added financial burdens and profound administrative
problems."'67 Noting that the majority did not offer any evidence to support
the Bureau's belief that granting Goodwin's request would lead to a large
number of requests from female inmates for artificial insemination,
McMillian asserted that the interest in equal protection is merely
speculative."
After determining that the Bureau's position was not legitimate, Judge
McMillian next considered whether the Bureau's blanket prohibition of
artificial insemination is rationally related to its interest in treating inmates
equally 69 He maintained that "[i]f equal treatment is a sufficient basis to
deny inmates [an] otherwise accommodatable constitutional right[ ], then
prisons would never be required to accommodate such rights because it is
quite likely that any asserted right might legitimately be withheld from
some inmates somewhere." 70 The dissent was correct in maintaining that
the blanket prohibition of artificial insemination is not rationally related to
the prison's interest in equal treatment, because equal treatment is not
rationally furthered by denying all inmates a constitutional right simply
because it might legitimately be withheld from some.7'
63 See Id.
64 See id. at 1405 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
65 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1404 (McMillian, J., dissenting).67 Id. at 1405 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
68 See id (McMillian, J., dissenting).
69 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
71 See id. (McMillian J., dissenting).
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The Goodwin majority's decision to uphold the Bureau's blanket
prohibition of artificial insemination is questionable for several reasons.
The court justified this restriction based on the impracticality of treating
male and female inmates' procreational rights equally 72 While courts
should aspire to equal treatment in the prison context,73 they cannot ignore
the biological differences that exist between men and women.74 Obviously,
if the Bureau allowed female inmates equal access to methods of artificial
insemination, this would raise significant institutional concerns not
unplicated when prison officials allow males to deposit their sperm in a
clean container.' Therefore, male and female inmates are not similarly
situated with respect to procreation, and courts should not uphold policies
denying male inmates the right to artificially inseminate their wives solely
because biological differences between the sexes would not permit the
same opportunities to be afforded to women inmates.76
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Goodwin v. Turner is also suspect
because male inmates' requests for artificial insemination do not
necessarily inplicate legitimate penological concerns, such as internal
security and discipline. All that would be required is a sterile container and
a means of transporting their semen out of the prison complex,77 and the
majority did not state how providing this sterile container would hinder
penological concerns. Furthermore, the Goodwin court's holding also opens
the door for prison officials to institute policies denying prisoners
accommodatable rights. When the courts review these policies, the equal
treatment argument could be used to deny prisoners any asserted right.78 No
' See id. at 1399-1400.
73 See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 565 F Supp. 1278,
1286 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that prison officials should afford male and female
inmates equal access to the library).
I4 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (holding that a
congressional decision requiring only men to register for the draft did not violate
equal protection because men and women are not similarly situated with respect to
conscription).
75 See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400. The Goodwin majority cited numerous
problems with allowing female inmates to be artificially inseminated, including
significant increases in medical services for female inmates and the financial
burden of infant care. See also Davis, supra note 11, at 185-8776 Ifthi were the case, then the courts would have denied women inmates the
right to elect an abortion in the name of equality See, e.g., Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
"See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1397, 1399 n.7
See id. at 1405 (McMillian, I., dissenting); see also Irah H. Donner, Goodwin
1997-981
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legitimate penological interests 9 are furthered by refusing Goodwin's
artificial insemination request, so the prison's blanket prohibition on
artificial insemination for inmates is not rationally connected to a
legitimate governmental interest and thus shouldnot have survved the first
prong of the Turner rationality test.
The next prong of the Turner test focuses on whether an alternative
means of exercising the asserted right is available to the prisoner.80 The
majority m Goodwin v. Turner found that even absent any alternatives, the
regulation is still reasonable because "none can exist without
compromising prison policy or expending a large amount of prison
resources accommodating the requests of its female prisoners." 81 The court
held that this absence of ready alternatives constitutes evidence of the
reasonableness of the Bureau's policy 82
Judge McMillian argued in dissent that the majority misapplied this
prong of the Turner standard.83 He specifically took issue with the majority
for considering prison administration interests as part ofthis second prong,
as the Turner standard specifically mandates that prison interests be
weighed in the third prong and not the second.84 Additionally, Judge
McMillian argued that it was incorrect to minimize Goodwm's depnvation
merely because there were no alternatives that would not compromise
prison policy.85 Rather, he insisted, prison officials should not be afforded
a great deal of deference when alternatives are not available.8 6 Judge
McMillian concluded that absent alternatives available to Goodwin, the
second prong weighed in favor of his right to procreate, and accordingly
the regulation failed to satisfy the second prong of the Turner test.87
The third prong of the Turner test focuses on the effect that
accommodating Goodwin's right would have on other prisoners,
v Turner: Cons andPro-Creating, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv 999, 1006 (1991).
9 In addition to security measures, denying male inmates the right to procreate
does not facilitate any of the other penological objectives, such as rehabilitation,
retribution, incarceration, or incapacitation. See supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text for a discussion of legitimate penological interests.8oSee Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
81 Goodwn, 908 F.2d at 1400.
82 See id.
13 See zd. at 1406 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
84 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
1 See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1405-06 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
6 See id. at 1406 n.7 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 1406 (McMillian, I., dissenting).
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corrections officers, and the allocation of prison resources.8 The Goodwin
court concluded that if Goodwin's request to be permitted to procreate was
granted, the Bureau would be forced to grant its female inmates the same
right. This would lead to a "ripple effect,"8 9 in that once female inmates
were granted the right to be artificially inseminated, the Bureau would have
to provide medical services for them, thereby taking away resources from
security and other legitimate penological interests." The court considered
both the risks and costs of accommodating male and female inmates under
this factor, and concluded that these costs weighed in favor of denying
inmates of both sexes the right to procreate.91 However, the majority
implicitly acknowledged that Goodwin's request could be accommodated
without any impact on inmates or prison resources, and provided no basis
for its assertion that granting male prisoners this right would lead to a
"ripple effect" of requests by female inmates. Since accommodating
Goodwin's request would only require supplying him with a clean
container and quicldy transporting the semen to his wife outside the prison,
for which he agreed to pay the costs, his request would not jeopardize
prison security or resources.
The dissent concluded that male and female inmates did not have to be
treated equally with respect to the right to procreate. 2 Judge McMillian
argued that the potential impact of permitting the insemination of female
inmates should not be considered in the third prong.93
Finally, the fourth prong of the Turner test examines whether there are
any regulatory alternatives to the challenged prison regulation.94 Here, the
majority's analysis is especially problematic because it failed to address
this prong. The dissent, by contrast, suggested two alternatives to the
Bureau's blanket policy of prohibiting all inmates from employing the
artificial insemination method to procreate.95 The first alternative is that the
Bureau could consider insemination requests on a case-by-case basis.96 If
a request would unduly burden the prison, then it need not be granted.97 The
second alternative is that the Bureau would promulgate a policy permitting
88 See Safley, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
'9 Goodwm, 908 F.2d at 1400.
9' See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1406 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
93 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
94 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
91 See Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1407 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
96 See id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
ISee id. (McMillian, J., dissenting).
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insemination only if it would not significantly burden the pnson.98 Since
alternative prison regulations are possible, the fourth prong of the Turner
test seems to weigh in favor of accommodating Goodwin's request.
In summary, all four prongs of the Turner test weigh in favor of
granting Goodwin's request. The policy of equal treatment of prisoners is
a legitimate governmental interest as a general matter, but it is not
rationally related to prohibiting all inmates from artificially inseminating
their spouses. Especially troubling is the majority's failure to apply the
fourth prong of the reasonableness test to the specific facts of Goodwin.
Perhaps the majority believed that the lack of regulatory alternatives
available to Goodwin directly disfavored accommodating his request.
However, by neglecting to analyze the fourth prong, the court undermined
its entire argument. The majority acknowledged that "in deciding whether
the challenged regulation meets tis reasonable basis test, Turner instructs
us to consider [four] various factors;" thus, its failure to discuss the fourth
prong of the test, regulatory alternatives, should automatically require a
decision in favor of Goodwin, because the court did not satisfy all prongs
of the Turner test and therefore did not meet its burden of demonstrating
a reasonable relation between a legitimate penological interest and the
blanket restriction on a fundamental constitutional right. Nonetheless, even
if the court had addressed the fourth prong of the Turner test, the Bureau's
decision still would not be reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest, and thus would not pass muster under the Turner rational
relationship standard of review
The Supreme Court has held that the privacy interest in the right to
procreate should not be discarded lightly 99 While the Court recognizes that
inmates' rights may be abridged to preserve and facilitate penological
objectives, the Court also has stated that there needs to be a rational
relation between restrictions on inmates' rights and the furthering of the
penological interest. The court's opinion in Goodwin v. Turner is therefore
troubling because the majority did not successfully demonstrate the
existence of a reasonable relation in upholding a blanket restriction on
procreation as a necessary means of furthering the legitimate penological
interest of treating all inmates equally
98 See id. In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court endorsed alternatives that
accommodate constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. Tus demonstrates that
the Supreme Court favors alternatives that do not unconditionally deny a
constitutional right to prisoners. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 93-98 (discussing
alternatives).
99See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
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IV PROCREATION RIGHTS UNDER JEWISH LAW
It is somewhat difficult to use Jewish law (halacha)' °0 and theology to
comment on a decision like Goodwmn v. Turner While the legal discussion
m Goodwin v. Turner revolved around rights, halacha focuses on
responsibilities. Halacha demands the observance of many different
commandments ("mitzvot") ofboth Biblical and Rabbime origin. Although
halacha does discuss property rights at length, it rarely talks about an
individual's right to limit state power. Halacha does not articulate a "right
to procreate." Tins is because of a fundamental difference m orientation
between halacha and American law
Despite this dissimilarity m orientation, one can examine halacha with
an eye to eliciting its view of Goodwmn v. Turner To begin with, one of the
mitzvot is to procreate. This is not viewed in halacha as a right, but as a
commandment, something one must do. However, only a governmental
authority that is guided by halacha would be obligated to facilitate the
observance of the mitzvot, and certainly could not specifically block the
performance of the mitzvot. In addition, the Bible enjoins courts not to
overstep their bounds when punishing those found guilty of a crime.'"' On
occasion, different halaclc values conflict with each other. These conflicts
are resolved by establishing a hierarchy of values to decide which
commandment should take precedence. By examining what place
procreation takes in this hierarchy of halachic values, we can infer its
relative importance.
A. The Biblical and Talmudic Basis of the Commandment to Procreate
This section begins with a discussion of the mitzvah (singular of
"mitzvot") to procreate, and examines the scope of this mitzvah. Noted are
exemptions from this mitzvah, as well as the halaclc sources that highlight
the great importance given to procreation in the Jewish tradition. The
section also discusses whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of procreation
through artificial insemination. Even in the absence of an actual mitzvah
to procreate, the Jewish tradition sees procreation as an important,
fundamental human activity As a matter of public policy, procreation
should be encouraged, assuming it does not cause undue stress to the
society or its member institutions.
" For an excellent introduction to halacha regarding procreation generally, see
DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 46-59 (1968).
.
1 See Deuteronomy 25:3.
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Genesis 1:28 says: "And God blessed them [Adam and Eve]; and God
said unto them be fruitful and multiply "This blessing echoes one given to
the birds and fish m Genesis 1:22. Similar blessings are found elsewhere
in Genesis, including blessings given to Noah (Genesis 9:1, 9"7), Abraham
(Genesis 17:1-2, 6-8), and Jacob (Genesis 35:11-12). Yet the verse m
Genesis 1:28 is understood by the Talmud as a mitzvah to procreate.' °2
Some medieval Jewish commentaries to the Bible explain that the
Talmudic ruling is based on an ancient oral tradition,0 3 which was later
related to the verse in Genesis 1:28. Nachmamdes explains that fis
mitzvah can be derived from the redundant "and God said unto them."'1°4
Gersomdes explains that the mitzvah to procreate can be logically deduced
from the blessing to procreate."' Man, unlike animals, can choose if he
wants to procreate; if all men were to choose not to procreate, God's
blessing would be rendered meffective. Therefore, God's blessing implies
a mitzvah to procreate.
The number and gender of children necessary to fulfill the mitzvah to
procreate is a matter of debate m the Mishnah and Talmud."° The opinion
that is accepted as normative is that the mitzvah is fulfilled after having
both a son and a daughter. 0 l7 These need not be natural children; infertile
couples can fulfill the mitzvah by adopting children.0 8
"o See Yebamot 63b. However, there is an opimon cited in the Talmud that the
source for the commandment to procreate is found in Genesis 35:11-12. See
Yebamot 65b and Tosafot s.v "velo."
'o3 See the commentaries of Ibn Ezra and Radak to Genesis 1:28.
'
04 Commentary of the Ramban and Rabbemu Nissim to Genesis 1.28.
'
05 See Commentary to Genesis 1:28.
"s The Mishnah in Yebamot 6 lb says it is amatter of disagreement between the
first-century Rabbinic schools of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The Talmud, in
Yebamot 62a, cites other versions of this disagreement. Among the other opinions
the Talmud mentions are that one must have two sons and two daughters to fulfill
this commandment or that even one child, of either gender, is sufficient to fulfill
this commandment.
107 See Shulchan Aruch Even Ha' Ezer 1:5. Meir, Yebamot 61b, Teshuvot
HaRashba 3:339, and Avnei Nezer, Even Ha' Ezer 1, are of the opinion that,
alternatively, one has fulfilled this commandment after having two sons. Cf. Otzar
Haposkim Even Ha' Ezer 1:5 (no. 29).
108 See Chochmat Shlomo, Even Ha 'Ezer 1.1. However, see the discussion on
artificial insemination infra Part IV.C. It would appear logical that the opinions that
exclude artificial insemination from the mitzvah of procreation would also exclude
adoption from this mitzvah.
[VOL. 86
PROCREATION RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
There are two additional Rabbinc commandments to procreate. One
is based on the verse in Ecclesiastes 11:6, "In the morning sow thy seed
and in the evening ("la-erev") do not withhold thy hand." This mitzvah is
known in Rabbinic literature as "la-erev." This indicates that there is an
obligation upon someone who has already had the requisite number of
children to continue to procreate. 9 However, this obligation is of a much
lower order.110 For this reason, a man who already has fulfilled the mitzvah
of procreation with Ins first wife, and is concerned that if he remarries and
has more children with his second wife family harmony will be disturbed,
may choose to avoid having more children."' Similarly, some are of the
opinion that in order to improve Torah study, one may avoid performing
the commandment of "la-erev "12 However, Rabbinic opinion strongly
disapproves of limiting family size for reasons of convenience.
3
109 See Yebamot 62b; Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha' Ezer 1:8. However, Rabbi
Naftali Tzvi Berlin, in his commentary Ha'amek She'alah (165:3-4), offers the
opinion that the Sheiltot is of the opimon that the commandment of "la-erev" is of
a Biblical nature. His reasoning is that even if one has already fathered the requisite
children, there is a concern that these children may not survive. Therefore, one
must continue to have children because one cannot be certain of the future of one's
present children. Ths interpretation of the Sheiltot is disputed by Raphael Yoffen
m his footnotes to 2 RIrTVAYEBAMOT 575 n.901 (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook,
1992).
110 The precise status of the commandment of "la-erev" is discussed by many
authorities. Most commentaries view itas having alower status than otherRabbruc
decrees. It is understood to be a mitzvah that one is commanded to perform if
possible. However, one who avoids performing "la-erev" is not considered to be
a "sinner." See the commentaries of the Ramban, Milchamot, and BaalHamaor to
the Rif Yebamot, pages 19b-20a. The Ramban says that "la-erev" is not an
enactment ("takanah") but rather a preferred mode of action ("derech eretz").
Compare the comments of TeshuvotMaharsham 6:134 that la-erev is on a hgher
level than other Rabbinic commandments because it is based on a Biblical verse.
There is a disagreement if one must sell a Torah scroll to help someone perform the
mitzvah of "la-erev." See Shulchan Aruch Even Ha' Ezer 1:8.
"I See Shulchan Aruch Even Ha' Ezer 1:8. But see The Chelkat Mechokek
(1.12) (disagreeing with Shulchan Aruch 1:8).
12iSeeRitva, Yebamot 63b, s.v. "Mah Easeh," TeshuvotMaharam Mintz no. 42,
Otzar Haposlm to Even Ha' Ezer 1:8 (no. 48).
1 3 See Tosafot, Baba Batra 60b s.v. "Din" (noting that on a communal basis,
if each couple would only have two children the community would eventually
diminish). See also TeshuvotMelamedLehoil3:118; FELDMAN, supra note 100, at
50-51 (noting that the duty of ongoing procreation is established in Jewish law.
Maiiomdes stated that a man is commanded by the Talmud "not to desist from
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Many are of the opinion that the verse in Isaiah (45:18) "Not for void
did he create this world, but for habitation (la-shevet) did he form it"
constitutes an additional obligation to procreate." 4 The Aruch HaShulchan
is of the opinion that Rabbis of the Mishnah saw this verse as the rationale
for the Biblical commandment of "be fruitful and multiply," but not an
additional commandment of Rabbinic origm. 115 The commandment of
"shevef' may include those who are exempt from the commandment "be
fruitful and multiply;" namely, Jewish women and gentiles."16 Unlike the
mitzvah of procreation, which requires a male and female child, many are
of the opinion that the mitzvah of "shevet" is fulfilled with one child.
Others are of the opinion that "shevet" requires both a male and a female
child. 17
Despite the fact that the blessing of"be fruitful and multiply" was said
to both Adam and Eve, the parents of all humanity, there are Rabbinic
opinions that limit the obligation to procreate to specific groups of people.
However, it should be noted that even though certain classes of people are
exempt from certain mitzvot, someone who is exempt from a mitzvah, but
chooses to perform it anyway, is considered meritorious. This is because
the rule m halacha is that those who are exempt from a mitzvah, but choose
to perform it anyway, receive divine reward for performing the mitzvah." 8
The Mishnah quotes a disagreement regarding whether a woman is
obligated in the mitzvah to procreate." 9 The opinion of the Tanna Kama is
that only men are obligated to procreate, while Rabbi Yochanan Ben
Berokah disagrees and maintains that both women and men are equally
procreation while he yet has strength.").
114 See Gittin 41b, Tosafot s.v. "Lo tohu." This point of view is accepted by the
vast majority of commentaries. See Otzar Haposkrim 1:5 (no.30).
.. See Even Ha'Ezer 1:4.
"
6 See Magen Avraham Orach Chaim 153:9; Beit Shmuel Even Ha'Ezer 1:2.
The Chelkat Mechokek (1.1) disagrees, and says women are not included in this
commandment. The Be'erHeitezv (1:2), in support of the ChelkatMechokek, infers
from the Rambam, Hilchot Issurez Biah 21:26, that women are excluded from the
commandment of "shevet." The Aruch HaShulchan (1:5) reasons that "shevet"
would include gentiles.
"
7 See Otzar Haposlam to 1:2 (30).
.See Kiddushin 3 la; in regard to the application of this rule to the mitzvah of
procreation see Teshuvot HaRan 32. In general, on the performance ofmitzvot by
non-Jews, see Mo~he Bleich, The Role of Manuscripts in Halakhzc Decision
Malang: Hazon Ish, His Precursors and Contemporaries, 27:2 TRADrION 37,45-
48 (Winter 1993) (discussing the performance of mitzvot by non-Jews).
"I See Yebamot 65b.
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obligated to procreate. The opinion of the Tanna Kama is accepted as
normative, and women are exempt from the mitzvah to "be fraitful and
multiply ,120
Several different explanations are given as to why women are exempt
from this mitzvah. Some explain that since childbirth is dangerous and
painful, it would be inappropriate for the Torah to command women to
have children. 2 1 Others say this exemption is intended to prevent women
from being viewed solely m terms of their fertility. By exempting women
from the commandment to procreate, women are no longer viewed as
"baby-making machines."'"
Although women do not have a Biblical mitzvah to procreate, they may
be obligated by a Rabbinc mitzvah to procreate. As noted above,'2 there
is a disagreement whether women are obligated m the mitzvah of"shevet."
However, even ifwomen are obligated in "shevet," they may choose not to
perform this commandment if they are frightened by the pain they will
have during childbrth. 24 Of course, a women performs a mitzvah by
helping her husband have children, since this is the only way he can
perform the mitzvah."~
The Talmud says that non-Jews are exempt from the commandment to
procreate.126 Some medieval authorities assert that non-Jews are also
obligated to procreate, and have a different understanding of this Talmudic
passage. 27 The opinion that non-Jews are exempt from this commandment
is accepted as normative. 2 However, despite this exemption, halacha
120 There were several early medieval authorities who ruled in accordance with
Rabbi Yochanan Ben Berokah. See JEREMY COHEN, "BE FERTILE AND INCREASE,
FILL THE EARTH AND MASTER IT" THE ANCmNT AND MEDIEVAL CAREER OF A
BiBLICAL TEXT 141-42 (1989).
121 See Meshech Chochmah, Geneszs 9:7
'1 See David Shapiro, BeFruitful and Multiply, in JEWISH BIOETHICS 69 (Fred
Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979).
"3See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
14 See Teshuvot Chatam Sofer 3:20. He also says that if a women has already
had children, she may choose not perform the commandment of "shevet" for any
reason at all.
1' See Ran, Kiddushin 41a, s.v. "Mitzvah bo."
126 See Sanhedrin 59b.
127 See Sheiltot no. 165; Tosafot Hagigah 2b, s.v. lo tohu. Teshuvot Shevut
Yaakov 2:134 explains that Tosafot is of the opinion that the Talmudic statement
exempting non-Jews is disputed by another opinion cited in the Talmud Yebamot
62a with regard to children a convert has prior to his conversion.
8 See Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha'Ezer 1:3.
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encourages non-Jews to procreate. '29 Some say the reason this mitzvah is
specifically directed to Jews is the small size of the Jewish people - a
concern for demographic survival. At the beginning of time, when the
commandment was first given, this applied to all humans. As the world's
population increased, the mitzvah to procreate was directed to the Jewish
people because of their small numbers. 130
In Jewish law, minors are exempt from the responsibility to perform
mitzvot. At age thirteen, aboy reaches majority and is obligated to perform
mitzvot. Procreation is an exception to this rule, and the obligation begins
at age eighteen. 3 1 One of the reasons given for this delay is that it has to do
with the young man's need to study Torah. If he marries at age thirteen, he
will not be able to study Torah at an age that is important to intellectual
growth. 32
The Talmud says that one may study Torah first, and then marry. 3 3 The
Talmud also cites the case of Ben Azzai, who, because his "soul desired
Torah," refused to marry 134 Some authorities see the case of Ben Azzai as
normative; a man may choose to refuse to marry and have children because
doing so would impinge on his Torah study 135 Others see Ben Azzai as an
exception, who because of his overwhelming passion for study was
incapable of focusing on the mundane demands of marriage. 136 According
to the latter view, an allowance is made to defer marriage for several years,
but even the scholar may not completely avoid having a family 137
On occasion, people are exempted from mitzvot if the performance of
the mitzvah will cause them pain and suffering. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach argues that a hemophiliac may choose not to have children if
having children who are hemophiliacs will cause substantial pain and
suffering. His reasoning is based on the rule that a person is not obligated
to spend more than a fifth of his or her assets to perform a positive
129 See Aruch Hashulchan, Even Ha' Ezer 1:5.
131 See Shapiro, supra note 122, at 70.
1' SeeMishnahAvot5:31, ShulchanAruch 1:3.ButseeRambam, Hilhotlshut
15:2, who says the mitzvah begins at age 17
" See Otzar Haposlam, Even Ha'ezer 1:3 (no. 13).
133 See Kiddushin 29b.
134 Yebamot 63b.
5 See Rambam, Hilchot Ishut 1:3; Shulchan Aruch Even Ha' Ezer 1:4; Beit
Shmuel Even Ha'Ezer 1:5.
136 See Ritva, Yebamot 63b.
117 See Rosh, Kiddushin 29b; Aruch HaShulchan 1.13-14 (quoting an opinion
that one may defer until age 24).
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commandment 38 (procreation is categorized as a positive commandment).
If someone is willing to pay a large sum, equal to a fifth of his assets, to
avoid the suffering of having a terminally ill child, then that person should
be exempted from any positive commandment that would cause such pain
and suffering. 39 Similarly, it would seem that a couple who require medical
assistance for fertility problems need not spend more than a fifth of their
money on fertility treatments and adoption. 140
Another question relevant to this discussion is that of enforcement.
Should a Rabbinic court ("beit din") enforce the obligation to be fruitful
and multiply9 This question is debated m the Talmud. 4' The Shulchan
Aruch accepts as normative the view that a beit din must enforce the
mitzvah to procreate. 42 The Rama says that the current practice is not to
enforce the mitzvah to procreate. 4 3 Several reasons are mentioned for the
custom being to not enforce the mitzvah of procreation. One is that it is
impossible to force someone to procreate as he can always claim he has not
found a proper mate. 44
Another reason for nonenforcement is based on a passage in the
Talmud.1'45 The Talmud discusses the enormous pain felt by the Jewish
people after the destruction of the Temple, and the various mourning
practices that were initiated by the Rabbis. One mournig practice that was
proposed was to decree that Jews may not marry and procreate, which
would have uprooted the commandment to procreate.'4 However, the
Rabbis of the time declined to make this decree because it was too extreme
to impose on the community Although it was not enacted, we no longer
treat the mitzvah of procreation in the same way because such a decree is
theoretically appropriate. Therefore, we no longer enforce this mitzvah. 47
... See Rama, Orach Chaim 656:1.
139 See 3 ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, NISHMAT AvRAHAM 69-70 (1993).
40 Any obligation to spend money for the purpose of assisted reproduction
assumes that one can perform the mitzvah ofprocreation with some sort of assisted
insemination.
141 See Ketubot 77a. There is some question as to whether the discussion in the
Talmud is relevant to people living outside of Israel. See OrZarua 653.5 (I:91a);
Rosh Yebamot 64a; Mordechai, Yebamot, no. 50.
142 See Even Ha'ezer 1:3.
'
43 See id.
" See Pitchei Teshuva Even Ha'Ezer 1:5; Otzar Haposlam 1:3 (nos. 18, 23).
145 See Baba Batra 61b; Tosefta Sotah 15:10. The text of the Talmud cited
above is found in the Mordechai and differs from the standard Vilna edition.
" See Anaf Yoseph, Baba Batra 61b s.v. "Din"; Iyun Yaakov, loc. cit., s.v.
"Din"; cf Tosafot loc. cit. s.v. "Din."
147See Mordechai, Yebamot no. 50; Beit Shmuel, Even Ha' Ezer 1:6.
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To summarize, there is a Biblical mitzvah to procreate; however, this
mitzvah is limited to Jewish males age eighteen or older. Several additional
exemptions are mentioned. While this mitzvah is obligatory on a small
percentage of the population, the performance of a commandment by
someone who is exempt from it is considered to be laudatory In addition,
halacha has a great interest in procreation. For this reason, those who are
exempt from a Biblical commandment to procreate, including women and
those men with the requisite children, are included in additional Rabbinc
commands. Non-Jews are also encouraged to perform the mitzvah of
procreation for this is the will of God.148
B. Procreation as a "Great Commandment"
Procreation is consideredtobe a "great mitzvah" ("mitzvah rabbah") 49
since "the world was created for procreation."'150 Because of this special
status, the mitzvah of procreation takes precedence over other mitzvot m
several places.'5 '
It is prohibited to sell a Torah scroll, even to acquire another sacred
object.'52 However, the Talmud says that one may sell a Torah scroll if its
proceeds will be used for the sake of marriage or for the study of Torah."s
The Dnshah understands this rule as allowing a person to sell his own
Torah scroll for the purpose of marriage or Torah study, but not to sell his
own Torah scroll for the sake of another's marriage or Torah study 1-1he
148 See Aruch Hashulchan, Even Ha' Ezer 1:5.
'
49 Ths term is used by Tosafot Gittin 41, s.v. "La," Gittin 38a s.v. "Kophm,"
Shabbat 4a s.v. "Vekhi."
'
5oGittin 41a.
1 See Avodah Zarah 13a (regarding a Kohen leaving Israel for the sake of
marriage); Ketubot 3b-4a (involving the ruling that the consummation ofmarrage
takes precedence over mourning); Rashba, TeshuvotHameyuchasotLeHaRamban
272 (regarding the precedence of marriage over the commandment to honor
parents); see also COHEN, supra note 120, at 173-80.
152 See Megillah. There is a disagreement if this refers only to a Torah that
belongs to the community, or even to a Torah owned by an individual. See
Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 153:10, and the comments of the Magen Avraham
in 153:23.
'5 See Megillah 27a; Tosafot, Baba Batra 8b, s.v. "Kophin" say that one may
sell a Torah scroll for the sake ofransommg captives. This ruling is accepted by the
Shach, Yore Deah 252:1.
" See Dnshah, Yoreh Deah 252:1.
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reason he is allowed to sell a Torah scroll for the sake of marriage is that
it benefits himself. The Shach disputes this ruling, and says that one must
sell a Torah scroll even for the sake of another's marriage.
155
Some extend this rule to allow the sale of a Torah scroll for the sake of
a woman's marriage. Although she is not obligated m the mitzvah of
procreation, she is obligated in the commandment of "shevet.' ' '56 The fact
that one is obliged to sell a Torah scroll, something that is otherwise
forbidden, for the sake of marriage, indicates that the mitzvah of
procreation has special status.
Jewish law attempts to abolish slavery as an institution; however,
because it was so strongly rooted in the ancient world, it was impossible for
it to be uprooted at once.I" 7 A half-slave half-freeman would find himself
m limbo with regard to procreation. 15 A half-slave half-freeman is neither
completely Jewish (because he is a half-slave), nor completely a non-Jew
(because a slave has the status of a partial Jew159). Such a person would not
be capable of marrying and procreating, for there would be no one that he
could marry' For this reason, a decree was umposed that a master must free
his half-slave, with the slave agreeing to repay what the master loses by
freeing him. This extraordinary decree, which usurps the property rights of
the master, is based on the idea that "the world was created for the sake of
procreation,"' 6° andhighlights the special standing the mitzvah to procreate
takes m halacha.
There is a disagreement whether the decree forcing the master to free
his half-slave is enforced even when the master will violate a mitzvah as
a result. Tosafot is of the opimon that the mitzvah to procreate is of such
great significance that it takes precedence above otherpositivemitzvot, and
155 See Shach, Yoreh Deah 252:1. This, of course, is when the sale does not
exceed the limits of charity.
156 See Magen Avraham Orach Chaim 153:9; Beit Shmuel, Even Ha'Ezer 1:2.
However, the Chelkat Mechokkek (Even Ha'Ezer 1.1) disagree. See the discussion
m Otzar Haposlam 1:2 (no. 11).
See the discussion by the late Chief Rabbi of Israel, 1 IsAAc HERZOG, THE
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 45 (2d ed. 1967).
"' See Gittin 41b. As to whether there actually existed half-slave half-freemen,
or whether this is merely a theoretical case used to encourage, see the opinions
cited by COHEN, supra note 120, at 155.
..
9 See Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha' Ezer 4:11 (regarding the status of a slave m
Jewish law).
160 Gittin, 41b.
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is comparable to a communal mitzvah.161 While the Rashba 162 Ran, 163 and
Meiril' take alternate approaches, it is the approach of Tosafot that has had
the greatest impact on subsequent halachic literature. 65
The Talmud talks extensively about the importance of procreation.
Refusal to procreate is compared (in an exaggerated way) to the spilling of
blood." This is because a refusal to procreate will cause negative
population growth and threaten the future of the human race.167 In addition,
.one who does not procreate is as if he has diminished the divine image.
168
This means that when humans, who are created in the divine image, refuse
to procreate, they are diminishing their divine image. This explanation
views the refusal to procreate as a lack of one's personal fiflfilment, a loss
of one's human potential.
C. Is the Mitzvah ofProcreation Fulfilled by Artificial Insemination?
The possibility that a woman may become pregnant by accident from
semen that was expelled in a bathhouse or onto a sheet is discussed by the
Talmud 169 and Medieval commentanes. 170 The possibility that a man may
impregnate a woman without sexual intercourse raises a question: Could
Goodwin, were he Jewish, fulfill the mitzvah of procreation with artificial
insemination? The Beit Shmuel asserts that a child produced by an
... See Shabbat 4a, s.v. "Hah "; Gittin 41b s.v. "Mitzvah."
162 See Gittin 38a, s.v. "HaMaphkirAvdo."
16 3 See Gittin 38a, s.v "Kol."
,
64 See Gittin 38a, s.v. "HaMishachrer."
165 This is primarily because of inconsistencies in the approaches of the Ran and
Rashba. See Minchat Chinuch no. 247; Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 90:30.
'
66 See Yebamot 63b.
167 See Maharsha loc. cit.
168 See Yebamot 63b. For more on the theology of procreation, see COHEN,
supra note 120, at 67-123, 196-220.
169 See Hagigah 15a.
170 See Alpha Beta LeBen Sira, in J.D. EIsENsTEIN, OTZAR MIDRAsHIM 43
(1928); quoted in the Bach, Yore Deah 195, s.v. "Velo " (quoting Rabbi Peretz of
Corbiel); Shiltei Gibborim, Shevuot 2a (Rif pagination); cited in Birkez Yoseph,
Even Ha'Ezer 1.14 (citing Rabbi Shlomo of London). These discussions revolve
around the concern that a woman might become pregnant by a man who is not her
husband. For more on artificial insemination in Jewish law, see ABRAHAM, supra
note 139, at 5-13 (Even Ha'Ezer); FRED ROSNER, MODERNMEDICINEAND JEWISH
ETHICS 85-101 (2d ed. 1991); and Alfred Cohen, Artificial Insemination, J.
HALACHA & CONTEMP Soc'y 13 (1987).
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accidental pregnancy m a bathhouse is considered the father's heir m all
matters, and that the father has fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation. 171 Some
disagree with the Beit Shmuel because of a concern that there is no reliable
evidence about paternity when a women becomes accidentally pregnant m
a pool, and therefore the putative father cannot be certain that he fulfilled
the mitzvah of procreation." This concern would not be applicable to a
case of artificial insemination where the father is clearly known.
Disagreeing, the Taz says that the mitzvah of procreation demands that the
father do some action meant to father a child and that when a woman
becomes pregnant by semen left m a bathhouse, the father is completely
passive and unaware of the pregnancy 173 Rabbi Jacob Emden'74 states that
when a woman becomes pregnant m a bathhouse, the father had no intent
to have a sexual or paternal relationship, and that m order to fulfill the
mitzvah of procreation, one must have, at a mnmum, intent for sexual
intercourse.'75
Rabbi Isaac Jacob Weiss argues that artificial insemination is superior
to an accidental bathhouse pregnancy m regard to the mitzvah of
procreation. This is because one of the objections to fulfilling the mitzvah
of procreation with a bathhouse pregnancy is that the father is completely
passive. However, when the father endeavors to have a child by artificial
insemination, those efforts are sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah of
171 See Even Ha'Ezer 1:10.
1 See sources quoted in ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 10.
17 1 See Even Ha'Ezer 1:8.
" See She'alat Ya 'avetz 2:97 The issue of what type of intent one must have
while performing the mitzvah of procreation is discussed in Otzar Haposkim 1.1
(no. 4) and Rabbi Herschel Schachter, Halachic Aspects ofFamily Planning, IV J.
HALACHA & CONTEMP Soc'Y 7 n.9 (1982).
175 These disagreements are based on a difference of understanding of what the
mitzvah of procreation entails. To some, the mitzvah of procreation is to engage in
sexual intercourse with a woman who is capable of having children. The actual
arrival of two children, male and female, is only a limit to when one may stop
trying to have children. This point of view is adopted by Waldenberg. See nfra
note 178. Others say that having children is the mitzvah and that sexual intercourse
is only a preliminary to having children. This view is adopted by the Minchat
Chinuch, Mitzvah 1. Within this view, there is room for the debate between the Taz
and Beit Shmuel about the need for an action on the part of the father. A final point
of view (mentioned earlier) is that of the Chochmat Shlomo, Even Ha' Ezer 1.1,
who sees the mitzvah of procreation as one of parenting, of the man playing the
role of father for an adopted or genetic child.
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procreation.1 6 Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg disagrees, for between
ejaculation and conception, the father's semen is handled by the doctor, and
the father has no control over whether conception actually takes place. In
addition, Waldenberg argues that to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation the
pregnancy must be the result of sexual intercourse.'" One can argue that
even if one adopts the more stringent view that artificial insemination is not
a technically valid way to perform the mitzvah of procreation, bearing
children via artificial insemination would still have halachic value. Tins is
because one can say that having a child, even without sexual intercourse,
is fulfilling the intent of the mitzvah. So, although there may be no divine
reward received for performing the mitzvah of procreation, fathering
children, m whatever manner, should at least exempt someone from the
mitzvah to procreate.
7 8
CONCLUSION
As the above discussion of the mitzvah to procreate shows, there are
very different tendencies in halacha. There is a tendency to limit the
obligation of this mitzvah. The mitzvah is limited to Jewish males age
eighteen or older. Exemptions and deferrals are given for Torah scholars
and for people for whom procreation will be an exceptional emotional,
physical, or financial burden. Unlike many other mitzvot, the mitzvah to
procreate is not enforced by a beit din, and no penalties are assessed for
noncompliance. Despite limiting the obligation of procreation, halacha still
recognizes that procreation is the fulfillment of a mitzvah and strongly
encourages it. Another tendency is to give the mitzvah of procreation
special status "because the world was created for procreation."' 79 Because
of this special status, certain religious obligations and financial rights are
waived in favor of the mitzvah of procreation.
We conclude that prison officials are bound to help prisoners who are
obligated to procreate perform this mitzvah, just as the community is
176 See Minchat Yitzchak 1:50; cf. Yabiah Omer, Even Ha Ezer H:1.
17 See TzitzEliezer3:27:3. For more sources on this topic see ABRAHAM, supra
note 139, at 10, and Otzar Hap oslam Even Ha'Ezer 1:6 (no. 42).
17' This assumes that children born via artificial insemination are viewed as the
halachic children of the father. For support of this argument, see Yebamot 62a,
regarding children born to converts prior to conversion; Tosafot, loc cit., s.v.
"Bnei"; Rambam, Hilchot Ishut 15:6. For a similar argument, see Rabbi Tzvi
Pesach Frank, Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Orach Chaim 11:76.179 Gittin 41 a.
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obligated to sell a Torah scroll. The prison would have to spend a
reasonable amount of money to help the prisoner procreate. This is true
provided it causes no severe financial or security problem. If it does, then
the prison can refuse because of the burden involved. To lessen the
hardship placed on prison authorities, they can demand that the prisoner
procreate through artificial insemination, andnot through conjugal visits.8 0
For a prisoner who does not have a mitzvah to procreate there are
several different factors to be considered. The enormous prestige given to
procreation even in instances when it is not a mitzvah suggests that public
policy formulated on the basis of halacha would demand that prison
officials be flexible and helpful in the performance of procreation. Any
unnecessary inflexibility ofprison officials couldpossibly result m visiting
an unintended punishment on the prisoner, thereby violating the Biblical
commandment against excessive punishment.' It would therefore be
incumbent upon prison officials to respond to requests like Mr. Goodwin's
with an open mind.
"0 Tins is true even though onamsm ("hashhattat zera") generally violates
halacha. See ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 107-13. Since the prisoner may pro-
create by artificial insemination if he has no other choice, the prison officials are
not required to endure any hardship to help the prisoner avoid hashhattat zera that
is sanctioned. The reasoning behind this is based on Minchat Shlomo, no. 7
"8 See Deuteronomy 25:3.
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